








Has the crisis impacted the determinants of capital structure 






The intention of the present dissertation is to identify the determinants of capital structure 
for Portuguese public firms for the period of 2005-2015 and in different sub-periods: 
before and during the global financial crisis, and during the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Thus, it proposes to empirically identify the firm characteristics and prevailing 
capital structure theories influencing managers’ decision-making process regarding the 
level of leverage. For the period 2005-2015, information regarding 57 firms from the 
Euronext Lisbon index was collected and analysed. Empirical results concluded that i) 
for the entire sample period, profitability and growth opportunities influenced negatively 
the level of leverage, while size and non-debt tax shields revealed to be positively related 
to indebtedness; ii) during the global financial crisis, profitability and liquidity were the 
only firm characteristics explaining the level of debt and iii) when the European sovereign 
debt crisis hit, growth opportunities and non-debt tax shields were the sole determinants 
in explaining Portuguese public firms’ leverage. The determinants influencing the 
proportion of long-term debt in the capital structure were also analysed for the same 








A crise influenciou os determinantes da estrutura de capitais 






O objetivo da presente dissertação é identificar os determinantes da estrutura de capitais 
das empresas cotadas portuguesas, para o período de 2005-2015, e em diferentes sub-
períodos: antes e durante a crise financeira global, e durante a crise europeia de dívidas 
soberanas. Propõe-se então a identificar empiricamente as características das empresas e 
principais teorias de estrutura de capitais que influenciaram o processo de decisão de 
gestores, relativamente ao nível de endividamento. Para o período 2005-2015, é analisada 
informação sobre 57 empresas pertencentes ao índice Euronext Lisbon . Os resultados 
empíricos permitem concluir que i) para todo o período, rendibilidade e oportunidades de 
crescimento influenciaram negativamente o nível de dívida, enquanto a dimensão da 
empresa e outros benefícios além da dívida revelaram-se positivamente relacionadas com 
o endividamento, ii) durante a crise financeira global, rendibilidade e liquidez foram as 
únicas características explicativas do nível de dívida e iii) durante a crise europeia de 
dívidas soberanas, oportunidades de crescimento e outros benefícios além da dívida foram 
os únicos determinantes a explicar o endividamento das empresas públicas portuguesas. 
Os determinantes que influenciaram a proporção de dívida de longo prazo na estrutura de 
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The present dissertation has the purpose of enriching the already vast empirical literature 
regarding the decision-making process of a firms’ capital structure. Therefore, in this 
study the identification of the determinants of capital structure for Portuguese public 
firms, for the period 2005-2015, will be carried out. Furthermore, this analysis will be 
comprehensive to the sub-periods before and during the global financial crisis and during 
the European sovereign debt crisis. Besides analysing the level of debt, the proportion of 
long-term debt in the capital structure will also be considered. This is an interesting point 
to observe due to the importance of long-term funding to support investment and firm 
growth. Also, as the crisis affected mainly the banking sector, by analysing the 
determinants of capital structure influencing the proportion of long-term debt, one will be 
able to analyse the main motivations for the change in the behaviour of the bank financing 
in the Portuguese economy before and during the global financial crisis and during the 
European sovereign debt crisis. 
Firms’ capital structure has been an immensely discussed topic over the last decades and 
several empirical studies and theories have been proposed in order to explain it. It is 
widely known that firms can always choose between internal and external sources of 
financing, i.e. whether to issue debt or equity. Bearing in mind that in corporate finance 
the primary goal of a firm is to maximize its value, having an optimal capital structure is 
a premise to this matter. Agency costs, pecking order, trade-off, market timing or 
mechanical stock price are examples of capital structure theories developed in the last 
decades, which will be presented in the following section. 
Likewise, different firm characteristics influence the capital structure choice of a firm. 
Such characteristics can be endogenous, i.e. related to the firm, as profitability, liquidity, 
tangibility, firm size, growth opportunities or non-tax related benefits, or exogenous, as 
for example the overall growth of the economy the business operates in. 
As previously mentioned, the present dissertation focuses on the period between 2005 
and 2015. This is a particularly interesting period for analysis, which includes the global 
financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, one of the main goals 
of this thesis is to understand how did the determinants of Portuguese public firms’ capital 
structure changed during these periods. 
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The global financial crisis, or the subprime crisis, initiated in the United States of 
America, rapidly expanded causing repercussions all over the world. The collapse of the 
speculative housing market bubble compromised the entire mortgage industry. This 
industry has always been based on trust. Without trust, liquidity problems arise leading 
afterwards to insolvency in the real economy by preventing non-financial businesses to 
be granted financing in order to normally operate. At this point, the entire system begins 
to collapse leading to recession. In a global era, this rapidly spreads across the entire 
world, especially through trade and financial bonds. 
The global financial crisis was also one of the causes of the European sovereign debt 
crisis. The European sovereign debt crisis occurred when several European countries 
were forced to ask for international financial help in order to avoid the collapse of their 
financial systems. Once again a problem of confidence affected businesses and 
economies. Portugal, together with countries such as Iceland, Greece and Ireland, was 
one of the countries to ask for financial help. In order to be granted bailout funds, the 
implementation of austerity measures and structural reforms took place which affected in 
multiple ways households and businesses.  
The motivation of this study is based on the need to evaluate the impact of such events in 
the determinants of Portuguese public firm’s capital structure. 
The remainder of the present dissertation is structured as follows. Section 2, presents the 
most prevalent empirical literature regarding capital structure theories. Section 3, 
describes the methodology implemented in this study. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results from the descriptive statistics and the model while Section 5 displays the 
robustness tests’ outputs. The main conclusions are presented in Section 6. In Section 7 
one can find the limitations faced and suggestions of topics for further research. Finally, 
Sections 8 and 9 display, respectively, the tables’ outputs that support the empirical 








2. Literature Review 
In corporate finance, a lot of research has been conducted over the past decades and a 
number of theories have been proposed regarding whether firms have an optimal capital 
structure or not, meaning if they are financed through an optimal mix of equity and debt.  
The Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1958) theorem can be considered as the first theory to 
emerge regarding capital structure. This model states that under circumstances of perfect 
capital markets, i.e. absence of taxes, transaction and bankruptcy costs, similar borrowing 
costs for both firms and investors, symmetry of market information and no effect of debt 
on a firm's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), the way a firm is financed does not 
affect the value of the firm. In other words, the firm’s value is independent of the firm’s 
financing policy. 
The first proposition of this theorem, known as the capital structure irrelevance 
proposition, states that a firm’s market value is not affected by the firm’s capital structure. 
This is supported by the above mentioned unrealistic assumptions as in the real world 
perfect capital markets do not hold. It is assumed that investors have homogeneous 
expectations concerning future cash flows and one is in presence of a perfect capital 
market, meaning there are no taxes, transaction or bankruptcy costs and all agents have 
symmetric information. Also investors borrow and lend at the same rate, there are no 
agency costs and investment and financing decisions are independent of one another. Here 
firms are indifferent to the source of capital and the weighted average cost of capital (rwacc) 
remains constant even when the firm’s capital structure changes, so there is no benefit 
from increasing borrowing as there is no interest deductibility.  
The second proposition states that the cost of equity increases as the firm increases its 
leverage, meaning the cost of equity is a linear function of the firm’s capital structure. As 
bondholders have a senior claim over the firm’s assets in comparison to equity holders, 
the cost of debt is less than the cost of equity. Being debt a cheaper source of capital it is 
more used. The rwacc remains constant, as the increase of debt in the capital structure is 
balanced out with the increase in the cost of equity, so there is no benefit in using debt 
over equity. 
In 1963, Modigliani and Miller refined the model by introducing corporate taxes. The 
introduction of taxes enhances the value of the firm resultant from the tax shield provided 
by interest deductibility. By acknowledging tax savings, this approach assumes that a 
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change in the firm’s capital structure affects the rwacc. Therefore an increase in debt, 
lowers the cost of capital, increasing in this way the value of the firm, so the higher the 
leverage, the higher the value of the firm.  
MM theorem was then contested by Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe (1993) that stated that this 
theory was incompatible with the empirical evidence found. However, they also stated 
that the MM contribution was essential to the understanding of capital structure. Myers 
(2001) found difficulty in testing MM (1958) propositions. However, MM unrealistic 
approach by assuming perfectly efficient markets and ignoring realities such as taxes, 
bankruptcy, transaction and agency costs, or asymmetry of information, triggered most 
of the corporate finance research that has focused in disproving the irrelevance of capital 
structure (Stiglitz,1969) and in attempting to explain these imperfections giving origin to 
different capital structure theories. 
For instance, the imperfection of bankruptcy costs occurs when a firm is struggling to 
meet its obligations, fact that is neglected by MM (1958). Scott (1976) stated that a firm’s 
probability of incurring bankruptcy costs increases as the level of debt increases. Barclays 
et al. (1999) found that though the direct bankruptcy costs seem to have a small impact 
on a firm’s market value, the indirect costs can be substantial. As the relative level of debt 
in the capital structure increases over the optimal amount, the expected cost of financial 
distress increases as well. Therefore, a highly indebted firm faces a higher chance of going 
bankrupt than a firm with a low level of debt.  
Agency costs are inherent to conflicts arising from the separation of ownership and 
management of a firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1984). According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), the managers’ (agent) interests are not perfectly aligned with the 
ones of the shareholders (principal) which may lead to managers’ actions that are not in 
the best interest of shareholders. Appropriate incentives are necessary to prevent harmful 
actions by the agent and to align both interests of owners with the ones of the 
management. This is not possible without incurring costs, therefore Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) defined agency costs as the sum of: the monitoring costs, costs incurred by the 
principal in an attempt to control the agent; the bonding costs, expenses incurred by the 
agent in order to restrict his own potential harmful actions; and the residual loss, resultant 
of the wealth loss when agent’s behaviour does not maximize principal’s welfare. Hill 
(1998) stated that a firm with low level of leverage in its capital structure may not face 
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agency costs until it reaches a given threshold in terms of debt. Beyond this, the firm will 
start to be perceived as risky by debtholders which will rapidly trigger its agency costs. 
The more profitable the firms are, the higher the portion of earnings used to make debt 
payments, and the more investments a firm has, the lower the level of debt in its capital 
structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This happens as in this way there are less 
shareholders’ funds available for managers to spend in perquisites and works as a way to 
prevent agency problems. On the other hand, management under and overinvestment 
practices potentiate conflicts between shareholders and debtholders (Myers, 1977, 1993).  
As seen, conflicts arise not only from manager-shareholder relationship, but also from 
debtholder-shareholder relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), due to the benefits of 
debt financing in the first case and agency costs in the last one. By balancing the benefits 
against the costs of debt financing one can find the firm’s optimal capital structure. It is 
also worth to mention that research regarding agency costs models found that a firm’s 
capital structure is positively correlated with its market value, free-cash flow, default 
probability and importance of managerial reputation (Harris & Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 1990). 
MM (1958) suggested that investors have homogeneous expectations concerning future 
cash-flows which in reality does not hold. For instance, managers have more timely and 
accurate information regarding current and future performance of a firm than other 
stakeholders. When having access to inside information, investors may benefit from a 
trading advantage which deteriorates capital market imperfections. According to Myers 
and Majluf (1984), information asymmetry between managers and new investors leads to 
an undervaluation in stock prices. This is the foundation of the pecking order theory.  
The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) states that firms have 
a hierarchical preference in terms of financing sources. Firms prefer to use in the first 
place internally generated funds to finance their operations, as this avoids being exposed 
to the asymmetric information problem. When retained earnings are insufficient, firms 
issue debt securities which pay a predefined remuneration, are less sensitive to 
information and are less risky, being therefore less costly. Only when issuing debt is no 
longer possible, the least preferred source of capital is considered, i.e. firms consider to 
go public by issuing equity. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal 
(2003) research supports the pecking order theory. On the other hand, this theory 
contradicts the MM (1958) theorem, as according to the pecking order theory, firms prefer 
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internal funds rather than external funds to finance themselves, therefore not benefiting 
from the tax shields resultant from holding debt (Fama and French, 1988). According to 
this theory, profitability and leverage are negatively correlated (Graham, 2000; Fama and 
French, 2002; Korajezyk and Levy, 2003). This happens as more profitable firms have 
more internal funds available to finance their operations therefore borrow less, and less 
profitable firms require external sources of financing which leads them to accumulate 
debt (Myers, 2003). 
The introduction of corporate taxes by MM (1963) originated the trade-off theory which 
weights the benefits against the costs associated to the use of leverage in a firm’s capital 
structure. According to Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), the optimal level of debt results 
from the trade-off between tax benefits of debt and bankruptcy costs. They state that an 
increase in the level of debt increases the probability of bankruptcy, increasing therefore 
expected bankruptcy costs. A firm will take on leverage until the optimal capital structure 
is reached, i.e. the point where the incremental tax shield benefit on additional debt is 
exactly offset by the incremental present value of possible costs of financial distress 
(Myers, 2001). 
According to the pecking order theory, profitability is negatively related with the level of 
debt as the firm will in the first place use its own resources to finance its activities (Myers, 
1984). Conversely, and as previously stated, according to the trade-off theory, 
profitability and level of debt are positively related. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) also 
found that more profitable firms benefit more from the tax advantages of debt. Also, more 
profitable firms have more free cash flows available so by having to make debt payments 
helps to align the interests of both managers and shareholders and to monitor management  
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Tangibility is also a predictor of leverage as 
firms with more tangible assets hold more debt as these are easy to collateralize, thus 
reducing the agency costs of debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
The risk of bankruptcy is seen as the main disadvantage of debt financing, even when 
accounting for the benefits of tax shields resultant from holding high gearing (Graham 
and Lemmon, 1998). Therefore, when a firm holds a high level of debt it is probably a 
way to control and monitor management. According to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
leverage is negatively correlated with the rate of investment, hence firms with more 
investments bear less leverage. In the same way, Nolan (2002) states that start-up firms 
may face higher chances of financial distress as their tangible asset base is low. With this, 
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one can infer that the trade-off theory suggests that firms with stable cash flows and a 
solid asset base may face a lower risk of bankruptcy. As a result, these firms tolerate 
relatively higher levels of debt in their capital structure. 
It is also worth to mention that personal taxes can be considered as a disadvantage of debt 
financing as according to Miller (1977) their existence may offset the benefits raised by 
interest deductibility, in which case no gain is reaped from using tax-deductible debt 
instead of equity. 
For Myers (1984), a firm that bases the choice of its capital structure in the trade-off 
theory gradually moves towards a set target debt ratio. Then, Frank and Goyal (2005) 
suggested the static and dynamic trade off theory. In the static trade-off theory, by trading 
off the interest deductibility with the financial distress costs, the optimal capital structure 
is reached. In the dynamic trade-off theory, the firm adjusts its behaviour in order to 
gradually reach the target capital structure. 
As seen, the pecking order and the trade-off theories diverge in terms of determining a 
firm’s optimal capital structure. However, both theories have a common view regarding 
the determinant of leverage, tangibility, as both state a positive correlation between 
tangibility and leverage (Fama and French, 2002). 
Meanwhile, the market timing theory was proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2002) which 
suggests that managers tend to identify more favourable periods of time to issue equity, 
i.e. when the firm’s market value is high which makes the cost of equity lower. This 
entails that firms choose their financing sources according to the relative costs incurred. 
Therefore firms prefer and are more likely to issue equity when the cost of equity is low 
and opt by debt under other circumstances. The authors also found that fluctuations in the 
market value of equity have long-lasting effects on the firm’s capital structure which was 
contradicted by Hovakimian (2006) and Kayhan and Titman (2007). Frank and Goyal 
(2004) went further stating this could not be considered a capital structure theory as there 
was not sufficient research to support it. After this, several authors presented empirical 
evidences that support the market-timing theory (Huang and Ritter, 2005; Hovakimian, 
2006; Kayhan and Titman, 2007).  
In 2004, Welch presented the mechanical stock price explanation which claims that 
managerial inertia allows share price fluctuations to have a significant impact on the 
firm’s capital structure by stating that “(...) over reasonably long time frames, the stock 
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price effects are considerably more important in explaining debt-equity ratios than 
previously identified proxies” (pp.107). 
As seen many theories have been proposed regarding the optimal capital structure 
decision and the determinant factors that influence that choice such as tangibility, 
profitability, liquidity, firm size, growth opportunities and tax related benefits (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Frank and 
Goyal, 2009; Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998). However there is still evidence 
lacking on whether the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis 
influenced the choices of Portuguese public firms’ managers when selecting the level of 
total and long-term debt on the capital structure. This is the gap that the present 
dissertation aims at filling in, i.e. estimating the determinants of the level of debt in 
Portuguese public firms’ capital structure before and during the global financial crisis and 

















The present dissertation aims at understanding and analysing the determinants of capital 
structure, in terms of total debt and proportion of long-term debt, for Portuguese public 
firms, listed in the Euronext Lisbon index. This study is conducted from 2005 until 2015. 
This time horizon comprises the time before and during the global financial crisis and 
during the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Following an analysis on the literature review regarding the already existent capital 
structure theories and the factors influencing a firm’s capital structure, in this chapter one 
will present the data, describe how the sample was constructed and identify the variables 
which will be used to carry out this study. After defining the variables, the research 
hypothesis tested and the empirical approach selected to validate the research hypothesis 
are presented. 
3.1. Data 
In order to select the sample, the software Thomson Reuters Worldscope via Datastream 
was used as it has available all the financial information regarding Portuguese public 
firms. The necessary financial information was then extracted for all the firms present in 
the Euronext Lisbon index spanning the period 2005-2015, including for the firms that 
were already delisted. All data is in Euros. 
From this selection a total of 64 firms was found, from which 46 firms are currently part 
of the Euronext Lisbon index and the remaining 18 were delisted from the index since 
2005 until 2015. From this sample of 64 firms, the ones which operate in the financial 
sector were excluded. A total of 7 financial institutions were removed as these firms are 
responsible for granting credit to the economy and have a capital structure composition 
that differs from the remaining firms being analysed. Authors as Frank and Goyal (2003) 
and Fama and French (2002) have also excluded the financial sector from their research. 
After this adjustment a total of 57 firms remained relevant for the study which in the end 
formed the final sample (Table 1). From the 57 firms, 42 are currently part of the Euronext 





3.2. Variables Definition 
In order to estimate the model, some of the factors addressed in the literature review 
regarding the determinants of a firm’s capital structure will be used. So far, several 
authors have conducted empirical research on this theme which will serve as support to 
this study (Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 
1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Myers and Sunder, 1999; Fama and French, 2002, 
among others).  
In this dissertation the variables i) Leverage (LEV) and ii) Long-term Leverage (LTLev) 
are used to describe the capital structure of each firm (Table 2). Leverage is estimated as 
the ratio of Debt to Total Assets, while Long-term Leverage results from the ratio of 
Long-term Liabilities to Total Debt. These two dependent variables differ from one 
another as the first one measures the level of debt in the capital structure while the second 
one tries to measure the proportion of long-term debt in the capital structure.  
As previously stated, when choosing a firm’s capital structure several firm characteristics 
proved to influence this decision. Therefore the most relevant factors will be verified as 
independent variables, according to several studies and theories related to the theme.  
The firm characteristics selected were i) Profitability, ii) Liquidity, iii) Tangibility, iv) 
Size, v) Growth opportunities and vi) Non Debt Tax Shields (Table 3).  
i) Profitability is measured using the indicator Return on Assets (ROA) (Myers, 1984; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995). According to the pecking order theory, the greater the 
profitability of a firm, the lower the level of debt in the capital structure as the firm will 
in the first place use its own resources to finance its activities. Therefore Myers (1984) 
relates negatively profitability and level of debt. On the other hand, according to the trade-
off theory, profitability and level of debt are positively related as more profitable firms 
have greater facility to borrow debt and negotiate more advantageous conditions.  
Despite these two different perspectives, this determinant behaviour is expected to be 
negatively related with the level of debt, as this result seems to be very consistent across 
several empirical studies (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; and Fama and French, 2002). 
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Nonetheless the sign of the relation between profitability and the level of debt will signal 
the evidence of Portuguese public firms to base their capital structure decisions according 
to the pecking order theory or not.  
 Hypothesis 1: Profitability has a negative effect on leverage. 
ii) Liquidity was measured using the Current ratio, which relates Current Assets with 
Current Liabilities. This determinant is related to the degree of easiness a firm has to meet 
its financial obligations as they come due with the liquid assets in its possession.  
Graham (2000) relates these two variables negatively. Authors as Frieder and Martell 
(2006) and Lipson and Mortal (2009), found that more liquid firms not only have a 
considerably low level of debt in its capital structure, as they are more likely to raise 
equity instead of debt when in need for external financing. Submitter and Anderson 
(2002) and Sibilkov (2007) found empirical evidence that firms with more liquid assets 
bear a higher level of debt in its capital structure, relating therefore these two variables 
positively.  
 Hypothesis 2: Liquidity has a negative effect on leverage. 
iii) Tangibility is calculated using the ratio of Tangible Assets to Total Assets. Regarding 
this determinant, the relationship with the level of debt is expected to be positive, meaning 
that the higher the level of tangible assets, the higher the level of leverage in a firm’s 
capital structure. This relationship is supported by both the pecking order and trade-off 
theories (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; 
Frank and Goyal, 2003). However, authors as Titman and Wessels (1988) found no 
empirical conclusion regarding this variable on the level of debt. 
 Hypothesis 3: Tangibility has a positive effect on leverage. 
iv) Size is used as proxy to infer a firm’s ability to obtain financing, as larger firms usually 
obtain a lower cost of financing as they appear to have a lower risk of default (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). Size is measured as the natural logarithm of Total Assets (Frank and 
Goyal, 2003; Ramadan, 2009; Novo, 2009). This determinant is expected to yield a 
positive relation with the level of debt as the higher the dimension of the firm, the higher 
the likelihood to support more debt on its capital structure (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Nonetheless some authors could not 
find empirical evidence to prove the pecking order theory as inconclusive results were 
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found regarding the relation between the size of a firm and its level of debt (Kremp et al., 
1999; Ozkan, 2001). 
 Hypothesis 4: Firm size has a positive effect on leverage. 
v) A firm’s growth opportunities will be measured through the Tobin’s Q ratio which 
relates the Market Value of the firm with its Total Assets (Myers, 1977; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). According to the trade-off theory, growth opportunities and level of 
leverage are inversely correlated as firms and creditors have a lower predisposition to 
engage on new projects with high costs and uncertainty associated (Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002). Conversely, it is expected that 
growth opportunities and the level of debt are positively related, according to the pecking 
order theory, which states the hierarchy of the different sources of funding (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Ramalho and Silva, 2009). Similar results are associated with the agency 
costs theory as engaging in high growth opportunities, which leads to a higher 
indebtedness, serves the purpose of controlling management behaviour (Jensen, 1986). 
 Hypothesis 5: Growth opportunities have a negative effect on leverage. 
vi) Non-Debt Tax Shields will be measured as the ratio between Depreciation and 
Amortizations to Total Assets (Titman and Wessels, 1988). This determinant is related to 
the tax optimization solely achieved by depreciation and amortization when financing is 
not considered (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). 
Regarding this determinant it is expected an inverse relation with the level of debt, 
according to Myers (1977). On the other hand, authors as Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, (1984) 
and Titman and Wessels (1988) found a positive relation. 
 Hypothesis 6: Non Debt Tax Shields have a positive effect on leverage. 
Following the presentation of the firm characteristics which will be object of study, and 
bearing in mind that the present dissertation aims at analysing the determinants of capital 
structure for Portuguese public firms, throughout the time encompassing the sub-periods 
before and during the global financial crisis and during the European sovereign debt 
crisis, 3 dummy variables were defined to control these temporal incidents. Therefore the 
period 2005–2007 will be considered the “normal times”, prior to the crisis, from 2008 
until the end of 2010, it will be measured the impact of the global financial crisis, and the 
following years 2011–2014 will quantity the effect of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
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Besides testing the Hypotheses related with the level of leverage in the capital structure, 
so far presented, one will also observe which determinants of capital structure influenced 
the proportion of long-term debt, during the 3 different sub-periods in analysis, which 
include periods of economic breakdowns. Bearing in mind the importance of long-term 
funding to support investment and firm growth, this will permit to observe not only the 
behaviour of firms regarding their own financing decisions but also the behaviour of 
banks when granting credit to businesses, when in normal times and in times of a 
struggling economy.  
3.3. Empirical Approach 
The following model has the purpose of evaluating the research hypothesis previously 
proposed. It is going to be used an unbalanced panel data as the available data sample 
consists of a group of firms, analysed during a period of time, in which information 
regarding some variables is sometimes missing. This approach is seen as advantageous 
as it is able to combine both time series and cross sectional data which is the case of the 
analysed sample. 
Similar to previous empirical studies as Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, (1984) and Frank and 
Goyal (2003), in order to identify the determinants of Portuguese public firms’ capital 
structure, it is going to be used a multivariate linear regression model in order to assess 
the relation between the dependent and the independent variables.  
Before choosing a model to evaluate the data, a LM test was conducted to test the 
relevance of firms’ unobservable individual effects and the results indicated a pooled OLS 
regression to be an inappropriate model to analyse the relation between debt and its 
determinants. This was the expected result as this model does not allow to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Following this, the fixed effects and the random effects models were the available 
alternatives. In order to choose between them, a Hausman test was conducted. This test 
checks for the absence of correlation between firms’ unobservable individual effects and 
the determinants of debt. After running the test, for a 5% significance level, evidence 
showed the panel model of random effects to be the most accurate way to carry out the 
study. Although for a 10% significance level, the panel model of fixed effects was the 
best alternative. The 5% significance level was selected, therefore the panel model of 
random effects was used. Furthermore, every regression was then corrected for the 
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presence of heteroscedasticity, using robust standard errors. Although the random fixed 
effects is the model used to carry out this study, the results obtained using the fixed effects 
model are presented in the Appendix. 
To evaluate the research hypothesis, the following multivariate regression was used:  
LEVit = β0 + β1PROFit + β2LIQit + β3TANGit + β4SIZEit + β5GROWit + β6NDTSit + Uit + 
Ɛit (1), in which LEVit is the dependent variable and represents the leverage ratio of firm 
i at year t. The independent variables are: i) PROFit that corresponds to the return on 
assets of firm i at year t; ii) LIQit, is the current ratio of firm i at year t; iii) TANGit 
corresponds to the asset tangibility ratio of firm i at year t; iv) SIZEit is measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets of firm i at year t; v) GROWit is computed through the 
Tobin's Q ratio of firm i at year t; and vi) NDTSit corresponds to the ratio between 
Depreciation and Amortizations to Total Assets of firm i at year t. β0, β1,…, β6 are the 
coefficients of the regression, Uit represents the unobserved individual effects and Ɛit 
corresponds to the error term. 
As the purpose is to assess the changes in the determinants of capital structure for 
Portuguese public firms before and during the global financial crisis and during the 
European sovereign debt crisis, the following 3 dummy variables were added to the 
model: BEFGFC for the period 2005-2007; DURGFC for the period 2008-2010; and 
DURESD for the period 2011-2014. 
After checking the results regarding the determinants of debt for Portuguese public firms, 
from 2005 to 2015 and in the 3 different sub-periods, the results for the determinants for 
the proportion of long-term debt in the capital structure for the same firms and for the 
same time horizon were analysed. To evaluate the research hypothesis, the multiple 
regression used was: 
LTLevit = β0 + β1PROFit + β2LIQit + β3TANGit + β4SIZEit + β5GROWit + β6NDTSit + Uit 
+  Ɛit (2), in which LTLevit is the dependent variable which measures the proportion of 
long-term debt in the capital structure of firm i at year t. Regarding the independent 






4. Empirical Results 
Before analysing the results regarding the determinants of capital structure for Portuguese 
public firms, from 2005 until 2015, the descriptive statistics for the entire sample are 
presented in Table 4. 
Regarding the dependent variables, leverage (LEV) and proportion of long-term debt 
present in a firm’s capital structure (LTLev), it can be inferred that Portuguese public 
firms have, on average, 44% of debt on their capital structure. Besides this, these firms 
depend more, on average, on long-term debt than on short-term debt as the average 
percentage of long-term debt in their capital structure is about 62%. 
The descriptive statistics results suggest that there is no strong evidence for the presence 
of outliers in the sample group, as the difference between the medians and the means is 
not very significant for most of the variables. However, for the dependent variable, LEV, 
and independent variables, LIQ, PROF and GROW, the minimum and maximum values 
depart considerably from their means which might suggest the presence of outliers. In 
order to deal with this, a 90% winsorization of the sample will be later conducted and the 
respective results presented. 
From the Pearson’s correlation matrix (Table 5), it can be inferred that the correlation 
coefficients are, in general, relatively low among all variables. However, there seems to 
be one exception, a case of moderate correlation between the independent variable SIZE 
and the dependent variable, LTLev, of 51%. For the remaining variables, according to 
Gujarati (2003), multicollinearity can be safely ignored as the existence of a linear 
relation between one or more explanatory variables appears not to be identified in the 
present sample data, therefore the validity of the regression model is verified. 
Now, the outputs estimated by the regression model are going to be presented (Table 6). 
Regressions (1) and (2) have as dependent variables, the leverage ratio (LEV) and the 
ratio of long-term debt to total debt (LTLev), respectively. The explanatory variables are 
the same for both regressions: profitability (PROF), liquidity (LIQ), tangibility (TANG), 
size (SIZE), growth opportunities (GROW) and non-debt tax shields (NDTS). 
The overall goodness of fit of the model is firstly evaluated by running the F-test in order 
to assess the joint significance of the several coefficients. The null hypothesis that the 
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coefficients are equal to 0 is rejected for both regressions, at 1% significance level, 
meaning the coefficients are jointly different from 0.  
Following this, the z-statistics are evaluated. It is concluded that when leverage (LEV) is 
the dependent variable (1), profitability (PROF), liquidity (LIQ), growth opportunities 
(GROW) and non-debt tax shields (NDTS) are, at 1% significance level, statistically 
significant, and size (SIZE) is at 5% significance level. This means that for these 
variables, the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to 0 is rejected. For regression 
(2), liquidity (LIQ), tangibility (TANG) and size (SIZE) are statistically significant at 1% 
significance level, and profitability (PROF) is at 5% significance level. For regression 
(1), tangibility, and for regression (2), growth opportunities and non-debt tax shields, do 
not add any statistical significance to the model, therefore there is no purpose in 
evaluating their effect on the dependent variables. 
In regression (1), results demonstrate that the level of debt of Portuguese public firms is 
negatively related with profitability, liquidity and growth opportunities, therefore 
verifying Hypotheses 1, 2 and 5, respectively. On the other hand, results show a positive 
relation between size and non-debt tax shields with the level of leverage, therefore 
verifying Hypotheses 4 and 6. These findings suggest that Portuguese public firms’ 
managers, from 2005-2015, based their decisions according to the pecking order theory, 
when solely looking at the profitability coefficient. This means that Portuguese public 
firms had a hierarchical preference in terms of financing sources, preferring firstly to use 
internally generated funds, then to issue debt and only to issue equity when the other two 
alternatives were no longer available. Regarding the determinant liquidity, the results 
support Graham’s (2000) findings. When analysing growth opportunities, evidence is in 
accordance with findings of Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Fama and French (2002), and relate the trade-off theory with these firms. This indicates 
that Portuguese public firms weighted the benefits against the costs associated to the use 
of leverage when choosing the firm’s capital structure. Likewise, evidence related with 
the variable size is similar to the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and 
Goyal (2003) and evidence related with variable non-debt tax shields is supported by 
Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988).  
Regarding regression (2), which relates the firm characteristics with the amount of long-
term debt in the capital structure, and comparing the results with regression (1), it is 
concluded that profitability and liquidity are positively related with the level of long-term 
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debt, conversely to what is witnessed for the level of leverage. Besides this and similarly 
to what is observed for the level of leverage, firm size yields a positive effect on the 
proportion of long-term debt. Finally, tangibility reveals a negative association with the 
amount of long-term debt in the capital structure. Bearing in mind the importance of long-
term funding to support investment and firm growth, these results demonstrate that when 
accessing to financing, banks granted credit to larger firms that demonstrated to be more 
profitable and liquid, which signalled a higher ability to support debt on their capital 
structure. 
After analysing the results for the overall sample period, the sample period is going to be 
split in order to infer the results for the periods before and during the global financial 
crisis and during the European sovereign debt crisis (Table 7). 
Evidence shows that prior to the global financial crisis, 2005-2007, the firm 
characteristics influencing the choice of the level of debt for Portuguese public firms were 
growth opportunities, at 1% significance level, size, at 5% significance level, and 
tangibility, at 10% significance level. These findings validate Hypotheses 4 and 5 as the 
effects of size and growth opportunities on level of debt are positive and negative, 
respectively. This means that prior to the crisis, Portuguese public firms’ management 
decisions regarding capital structure was supported both by the pecking order and the 
trade-off theories. Also, according to Rajan and Zingales (1995) and others, larger firms 
have a higher likelihood to support more debt on their capital structure, which is supported 
in this study, as the analysed firms comprise mostly the larger firms in Portugal. 
Furthermore, regarding growth opportunities, the small size of the Portuguese market 
may inhibit creditors to engage on new projects with high costs and uncertainty, fact 
observed by the negative correlation with the level of debt. As for tangibility, the impact 
reveals to be negative, therefore rejecting Hypothesis 3.  
During the global financial crisis, from 2008-2010, Hypotheses 1, 2 and 6 are verified as 
profitability and liquidity, at 1% significance, are negatively related with firm’s 
indebtedness, and non-debt tax shields, at 5% significance level, has a positive impact on 
the level of debt. During this period, the pecking order theory was one of the main 
foundations of capital structure decisions. This is easily observed by the negative relation 
between profitability and the level of debt, which demonstrates that more profitable 
Portuguese public firms decided to finance themselves firstly with internally generated 
funds and only then to recur to debt, having therefore a lower level of debt in their capital 
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structure. At this point, the repercussions of the global financial crisis began to make an 
impact and the Portuguese economy started to slow down. Markets started to freeze and 
to become highly illiquid. Typically, more liquid firms when in need for financing prefer 
to liquidate their assets in order to finance themselves. Although, during the crisis, firms 
faced a market with no buyers or buyers only available to trade at big discounts, therefore 
preferring to recur to debt. Besides this, firms began to feel the recession and started to 
incur in losses and mostly decided to finance them through debt. At the same time, the 
operating businesses needed to continue to operate in order to grow, therefore incurring 
in maintenance and capital expenditures. These expenditures increased the value of 
depreciation and amortization, thus explaining the positive relation between non-debt tax 
shields and the level of leverage.  
When the European sovereign debt crisis hits Europe and the implementation of austerity 
measures is felt in Portugal, from 2011-2014, Hypotheses 1, 2, 5 and 6 are verified. This 
means that profitability and growth opportunities, at 1% significance level, and liquidity, 
at 10% significance level, are negatively related with the level of debt, conversely to what 
is observed for non-debt tax shields, at 1% significance level. According to these results, 
the trade-off theory re-appeared to, together with the pecking order theory, justify the 
choice of capital structure for Portuguese public firms. Here, besides the above mentioned 
reasons, the credit crunch and the imposition of austerity measures in Portugal obliged 
banks to become more conservative in granting credit, especially to finance new projects 
with high costs and level of uncertainty. This explains the negative relation observed 
between growth opportunities and the level of debt. 
Regarding regression (2), before the global financial crisis, liquidity and size, at 1% 
significance level, appear to positively influence the proportion of long-term debt in the 
capital structure. During the global financial crisis, the same results are obtained. In the 
following period, of the European sovereign debt crisis, the results yielded in the previous 
two sub-periods are again confirmed. Although, in this period, besides liquidity and size, 
additional firm characteristics are considered statistically significant, at 1% significance 
level: profitability, tangibility and growth opportunities. Regarding these three variables, 
profitability influences positively the amount of long-term debt in the capital structure, 
contrarily to the negative effect exercised by tangibility and growth opportunities. Due to 
the importance of long-term funding to support investment and firm growth, these results 
demonstrate that during “normal times” and during the global financial crisis, when the 
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repercussions of the crisis started to be felt in Portugal, banks conceded credit by only 
taking into account the dimension and liquidity of the firm. Therefore, larger and more 
liquid firms, indicators of a robust presence in the market, tended to have a higher 
proportion of long-term debt in their capital structure. After this, when Troika appeared 
and imposed the implementation of austerity measures, banks started to become more 
cautious when granting credit and, besides observing the dimension and liquidity of the 



















In this section the validity of the model is assured by checking the robustness of the 
empirical results so far presented. The regressions are run again for a winsorized sample. 
In this case, it was implemented a 90% winsorization. This process is achieved by 
identifying all the data below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile, and set that 
data to the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively, for all the variables presented in 
regressions (1) and (2), for the entire sample period. This transformation allows for the 
elimination of potential outliers present in the data sample.  
The results obtained (Table 8) are consistent with the ones previously achieved. Although 
some variables lose their significance, the effect of the firm characteristics on the level of 
debt and on the proportion of long-term debt, previously observed, is sustained for the 
winsorized sample.  
Regarding the entire sample period, results show, for regression (1), that profitability, 
growth opportunities, size and non-debt tax shields are statistically significant, at 1% 
significance level, when the level of debt is the dependent variable. Size and non-debt tax 
shields are positively associated with the level of leverage for Portuguese public firms, 
therefore verifying Hypotheses 4 and 6. Conversely, evidence demonstrates a negative 
relation between profitability and growth opportunities which confirms Hypotheses 1 and 
5. For the winsorized sample, Hypothesis 2 which states that liquidity is negatively related 
with the level of debt, is not confirmed as previously occurred, as this variable is no longer 
statistically significant. 
The relation between firm characteristics and the proportion of long-term debt in 
Portuguese public firms’ capital structure is analysed by regression (2). As previously 
observed for the entire sample, and conversely to what is seen for the level of leverage, 
liquidity, at 1% significance level, is positively related with the level of long-term debt,. 
Further and similarly to what is observed for the level of leverage, firm size impacts 
positively the amount of long-term debt. As for tangibility, at 10% significance level, 
reveals a negative association with the amount of long-term debt in the capital structure. 
For the winsorized sample it is also observed that profitability no longer impacts the 
proportion of long-term debt. 
Winsorized results for the sub-periods before and during the global financial crisis and 
during the European sovereign debt crisis are presented in Table 9. 
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Evidence demonstrates that prior to the global financial crisis, 2005-2007, during the 
“normal times”, almost all variables proved to be statistically significant. Size, 
profitability and growth opportunities, at 1% significance level, and liquidity and 
tangibility, at 5%. With this, Hypotheses 1, 2 and 5 are verified as profitability, liquidity 
and growth opportunities are negatively related with the level of debt and Hypothesis 4 
is also confirmed as firm size is positively related with leverage. Regarding Hypothesis 
3, it is rejected as results demonstrate that tangibility impacts negatively the level of debt.  
From 2008-2010, during the global financial crisis, solely Hypotheses 1 and 2 are 
confirmed as profitability, at 10% significance, and liquidity, at 5% significance level, 
are negatively related with firm’s indebtedness. For the winsorized sample, the impact of 
the crisis is more intensely observed as the significance levels increased regarding the 
statistically significant variables and Hypothesis 6 is no longer verified.  
Likewise, for the sub-period of the European sovereign debt crisis, for the winsorized 
sample, solely Hypotheses 5 and 6 are verified. This means growth opportunities, at 1% 
significance level, impacts negatively the firm’s leverage, while non-debt tax shields, at 
5% significance level, have a positive impact on it. Now, profitability and liquidity, no 
longer affect the level of debt as previously observed for the non-winsorized sample. This 
means these variables do not appear to impact managers’ decisions when choosing the 
firm’s capital structure, when austerity times where felt in Portugal. 
Regarding regression (2), for the winsorized sample, from 2005-2007, liquidity and size, 
at 1% significance level, continue to positively influence the proportion of long-term debt 
in the capital structure. During the global financial crisis, the same results are obtained. 
During the European sovereign debt crisis, the results yielded in the previous two sub-
periods are once again confirmed. Although in this period, besides liquidity and size, 
tangibility, at 1% significance level, is also considered statistically significant, proving to 
positively influence the level of long-term debt in the capital structure. In this period, 
winsorization turned profitability and growth opportunities no longer significant in 
explaining the proportion of long-term debt in the capital structure of Portuguese public 
firms. 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the regressions using the fixed effects model were 
also estimated. The results, presented in the Appendix, are broadly consistent with the 




The present dissertation aims at understanding and analysing the determinants of capital 
structure, in terms of total debt and proportion of long-term debt, for Portuguese public 
firms, listed in the Euronext Lisbon index. A total of 57 firms are considered relevant for 
the study. 
As previously stated, when choosing a firm’s capital structure, several firm characteristics 
proved to influence the decision regarding the level of leverage in the capital structure. 
Thus the most relevant factors verified were i) profitability, ii) liquidity, iii) tangibility, 
iv) size, v) growth opportunities and vi) non-debt tax shields. 
From the results, it can be inferred that Portuguese public firms have, on average, 44% of 
total debt on their capital structure and depend more, on average, on long-term debt than 
on short-term debt. 
Regarding the determinants influencing Portuguese public firms’ capital structure, for the 
winsorized sample and the entire sample period, 2005-2015, results demonstrated that 
larger firms and firms with higher levels of non-debt tax shields tend to be more 
leveraged, while more profitable firms and firms with more opportunities to grow are less 
indebted. Evidence also demonstrated that, prior to the global financial crisis, 2005-2007, 
more profitable, more liquid, more tangible and high growing firms supported less debt 
on their capital structure, while larger and firms with more tangible assets supported more. 
During the global financial crisis, results solely showed that more profitable and more 
liquid firms supported a lower level of debt in the capital structure. And during the 
European sovereign debt crisis, firms with more opportunities to grow were less 
leveraged while firms with higher non-debt tax shields were more leveraged. 
The above presented results, from regression (1), for the entire sample period, 2005-2015, 
demonstrate that the pecking order theory is followed, as the negative relation found with 
profitability, sustains that firms firstly used the internally generated funds to finance their 
operations. Also, the low predisposition of creditors in engaging in new projects of 
Portuguese public firms, with potential risks, is revealed by the negative relation found 
with growth opportunities, revealing the presence of the trade-off theory too. For the 
Portuguese public firms which are mainly the larger firms in the country, the reasoning 
of Rajan and Zingales (1995) is verified, that larger firms tend to have higher levels of 
leverage. Furthermore, evidence related with variable non-debt tax shields is supported 
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by Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988). For the period before 
the crisis, 2005-2007, the determinants liquidity and tangibility also appeared to 
influence, negatively, the level of leverage of Portuguese public firms. This suggests the 
presence of the pecking order theory, as more liquid firms have a higher facility to 
liquidate their assets, in order to finance their operations, before recurring to debt. 
Regarding the negative relation with tangibility, it can be explained by the strong 
investment in R&D and innovation made by Portuguese public firms, to be more 
competitive. During the global financial crisis, the negative relation between liquidity and 
profitability with the level of debt demonstrated that firms with worst results financed 
their losses firstly with internally generated funds and by liquidating their assets, 
following the reasoning of the pecking order theory. Finally, at the time of the European 
sovereign debt crisis, the imposition of austerity measures made creditors less 
predisposed to finance new risky projects. 
Regarding regression (2), related with the proportion of long-term debt in the capital 
structure, for the entire sample period, 2005-2015, and during the European sovereign 
debt crisis, 2011-2014, results show that larger and more liquid firms have more long-
term debt on the capital structure, while more tangible firms have a lower level of long-
term debt. For the sub-periods, before and during the global financial crisis, 2005-2007 
and 2008-2010, respectively, results only demonstrated that more liquid and larger firms 
supported a higher proportion of long-term debt.  
Bearing in mind the importance of long-term funding to support investment and firm 
growth, possible reasons behind the results of regression (2), for the entire sample period, 
2005-2015, include, for the negative relation with tangibility, the strong investment in 
start-ups, highly intangible firms, and in innovation made by Portuguese public firms to 
become more competitive. The positive relation of liquidity with debt financing 
demonstrate that firms with highly liquid assets are able to be more reliable in terms of 
collateral, as in a case of a distress scenario, firms are able to sell faster their assets at 
prevailing market prices without a considerable discount to meet the obligations from the 
use of debt. And regarding the positive relation with size, larger firms are seen as safer 
and more sustainable businesses to invest, from the banks perspective. Furthermore, the 
3 sub-periods results, especially during the crisis, indicate low levels of scrutiny and 
highly flexible criteria of the banking sector in granting credit, as only the size and 




Besides the validity of the conclusions reached by the present dissertation, it must be 
outlined that this study faces some limitations. Firstly, the analysed sample is reduced as 
a result of the size of the Portuguese capital market, i.e. listed firms in the Euronext Lisbon 
index. Besides this, the data is only available on a yearly basis which also reduces the 
number of observations. 
It is also important to bear in mind that larger firms, mostly the ones that are object of this 
study, i.e. present in the stock exchange, face an easier access to financing than small and 
medium firms, which represent more than 90% of the business sector in Portugal.  
Furthermore, the aftermath of the European Sovereign Debt crisis, from the year 2015 
onwards, is not analysed as the data available is limited to reach accurate conclusions. 
Bearing in mind such limitations, suggestions for future research should include small 
and medium Portuguese companies in the analysed sample. This would allow to observe 
the differences regarding the effect of firm characteristics in the level of debt and in the 
proportion of long-term debt in the capital structure, not only between public and private 
firms but also across small, medium and large firms in Portugal. Also an analysis across 
industries would be advisable as there are sectors that rely more on external financing 
than others. And finally, it would be interesting to apply this study to different realities, 













Table 1: Sample analysed per activity on the Euronext Lisbon index  
This table presents the number of firms analysed per activity on the Euronext Lisbon 
index: firms currently traded at index, firms already delisted from the index, and the 
overall number of firms. 
 
 Traded Delisted All firms 
Description # Obs. # Obs. # Obs. 




Table 2: Dependent Variables analysed 
This table defines the dependent variables evaluated in the present dissertation. 
 
Description Abbreviation Formula 
Leverage LEV Total debt divided by total assets 




Table 3: Independent Variables analysed 
This table defines the independent variables evaluated in the present dissertation. 
 
Description Abbreviation Formula 
Profitability PROF Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets 
Liquidity LIQ Current assets divided by current liabilities 
Tangibility TANG Tangible assets divided by total assets 
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
Growth Opportunities GROW Market value of firm divided by total assets 










Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the entire sample (2005 – 2015) 
In this table are presented the descriptive statistics for the entire sample (2005-2015). 
These include the sample mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis for the dependent and independent variables. Leverage (LEV) is 
calculated by dividing total debt with total assets. Long-term leverage (LTLev) is 
computed by the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. Profitability (PROF) is measured 
by the indicator ROA, earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Liquidity 
(LIQ) is estimated by dividing current assets with current liabilities. Tangibility (TANG) 
results from the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Size (SIZE) is obtained by the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Growth opportunities (GROW) is measured by the 
Tobin's Q, which results from the ratio of the market value of firm to total assets. Non-
debt tax shields (NDTS) is given by the ratio of depreciation and amortization to total 
assets. Dummy BEFGFC corresponds to the period 2005-2007, prior to the crisis. Dummy 
DURGFC identifies the period 2008-2010, correspondent to the global financial crisis. 
Dummy DURESD relates to the period of the Euro Sovereign Debt crisis, from 2011-2014.  
 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Min Max St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
LEV 498 0.44 0.43 0.00 2.50 0.24 2.02 15.98 
LTLev 497 0.62 0.66 0.00 1.00 0.26 (0.74) 2.79 
PROF 497 0.03 0.05 (2.24) 1.66 0.15 (4.59) 123.41 
LIQ 489 1.02 0.90 0.02 7.65 0.79 4.28 31.56 
TANG 495 0.78 0.85 0.12 1.00 0.22 (1.19) 3.52 
SIZE 498 5.83 5.78 3.55 7.63 0.75 0.10 2.53 
GROW 461 0.41 0.27 0.01 3.33 0.44 3.07 16.75 
NDTS 494 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.03 1.29 4.24 
BEFGFC 498 0.27 0 0 1 0.45 1.02 2.04 
DURGFC 498 0.27 0 0 1 0.45 1.02 2.04 












Table 5: Pearson's Correlation Matrix 
This table displays pair-wise correlations between the dependent and independent 
variables, from 2005 to 2015. Leverage (LEV) is calculated by dividing total debt with 
total assets. Long-term leverage (LTLev) is computed by the ratio of long-term debt to 
total debt. Profitability (PROF) is measured by the indicator ROA, earnings before 
interest and taxed divided by total assets. Liquidity (LIQ) is estimated by dividing current 
assets with current liabilities. Tangibility (TANG) results from the ratio of tangible assets 
to total assets. Size (SIZE) is obtained by the natural logarithm of total assets. Growth 
opportunities (GROW) is measured by the Tobin's Q, which results from the ratio of the 
market value of firm to total assets. Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) is given by the ratio of 
depreciation and amortization to total assets. 
 
 LEV LTLev PROF LIQ TANG SIZE GROW NDTS 
LEV 1        
LTLev (0.08) 1       
PROF (0.19) 0.12 1      
LIQ (0.32) 0.29 (0.22) 1     
TANG (0.03) (0.13) (0.09) 0.23 1    
SIZE (0.09) 0.51 0.18 0.12 (0.05) 1   
GROW (0.29) 0.14 (0.07) 0.21 (0.06) 0.18 1  

























Table 6: Summary Regressions Outputs for the entire sample (2005-2015) 
In this table are presented, for the entire time period, the coefficients, z-statistics, number 
of observations, number of firms, R2 and F for the regressions with LEV as dependent 
variable (1) and LTLev as dependent variable (2), respectively. The independent variables 
of both regressions are: PROF, measured by the indicator ROA; LIQ, estimated by the 
current ratio; TANG, resultant of the tangibility ratio; SIZE, obtained by the natural 
logarithm of total assets; GROW, measured by the Tobin's Q; and NDTS, yielded by the 
ratio of depreciation and amortization to total assets. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per 















Period 2005 - 2015 
Dependent Variable LEV (1) LTLev (2) 
 Coefficients z Coefficients z 
PROF (0.30)*** (6.66) 0.13** 2.36 
LIQ (0.05)*** (4.38) 0.10*** 7.23 
TANG 0.06 0.94 (0.22)*** (3.09) 
SIZE 0.06** 2.10 0.13*** 4.67 
GROW (0.10)*** (4.54) (0.04) (1.57) 
NDTS 2.90*** 6.95 (0.08) (0.16) 
Constant 0.02 0.12 (0.08) (0.41) 
# Obs. 450 450 
# Firms 57 57 
R2 16.09% 34.15% 
F 171.98*** 95.97*** 
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Table 7: Summary Regressions Outputs for sub-period samples 
In this table are presented the coefficients, z-statistics, number of observations, number of firms, R2 and F for the regressions with LEV as dependent 
variable (1) and LTLev as dependent variable (2), respectively, considering the sub-periods from 2005-2007, from 2008-2010 and from 2011-2014. 
The independent variables of both regressions are: PROF, measured by the indicator ROA; LIQ, estimated by the current ratio; TANG, resultant 
of the tangibility ratio; SIZE, obtained by the natural logarithm of total assets; GROW, measured by the Tobin's Q; and NDTS, yielded by the ratio 
of depreciation and amortization to total assets. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. 
 
Period 2005 - 2007 2008 - 2010 2011 - 2014 
Dependent Variable LEV (1) LTLev (2) LEV (1) LTLev (2) LEV (1) LTLev (2) 
 Coefficients z Coefficients z Coefficients z Coefficients z Coefficients z Coefficients z 
PROF (0.14) (1.11) (0.18) -0.93 (1.18)*** (6.91) (0.03) (0.15) (0.33)*** (5.33) 0.23*** 3.05 
LIQ (0.04) (1.51) 0.17*** 4.08 (0.06)*** (2.65) 0.15*** 4.57 (0.03)* (1.73) 0.10*** 5.31 
TANG (0.24)* (1.81) (0.29) -1.63 0.00 0.01 (0.11) (0.96) 0.06 0.55 (0.28)*** (2.83) 
SIZE 0.07** 2.01 0.14*** 3.21 0.02 0.53 0.20*** 5.26 0.02 0.45 0.17*** 5.30 
GROW (0.15)*** (3.54) 0.00 -0.04 (0.02) (0.36) (0.04) (0.72) (0.20)*** (3.93) (0.15)*** (2.65) 
NDTS (0.12) (0.20) (0.17) -0.20 0.02** 2.04 0.98 1.24 1.65*** 2.61 (0.05) (0.08) 
Constant 0.35 1.46 (0.09) -0.30 0.42 1.61 (0.66)*** (2.69) 0.34 1.52 (0.26) (1.21) 
# Obs. 124 124 123 123 162 162 
# Firms 47 47 44 44 43 43 
R2 15.79% 32.05% 48.80% 39.29% 29.71% 38.85% 
F 19.80*** 33.48*** 63.42*** 55.75*** 70.01*** 70.39*** 
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Table 8: Summary Regressions Outputs from winsorized sample, 2005-2015 
In this table are presented, for the entire time period, the coefficients, z-statistics, number 
of observations, number of firms, R2 and F for the regressions, with LEV as dependent 
variable (1) and LTLev as dependent variable (2), respectively, considering winsorized 
sample. The independent variables of both regressions are: PROF, measured by the 
indicator ROA; LIQ, estimated by the current ratio; TANG, resultant of the tangibility 
ratio; SIZE, obtained by the natural logarithm of total assets; GROW, measured by the 
Tobin's Q; and NDTS, yielded by the ratio of depreciation and amortization to total assets. 




Period 2005 - 2015 
Dependent Variable LEV (1) LTLev (2) 
  Coefficients z Coefficients z 
PROF (0.49)*** (3.44) 0.04 0.18 
LIQ (0.05) (1.63) 0.25*** 7.50 
TANG 0.01 0.19 (0.23)* (1.83) 
SIZE 0.12*** 3.73 0.13*** 4.00 
GROW (0.10)*** (2.76) (0.04) (0.74) 
NDTS 1.31*** 3.03 0.02 0.03 
Constant (0.26) (1.23) (0.21) (0.99) 
# Obs. 450 450 
# Firms 57 57 
R2 9.80% 35.07% 









Table 9: Summary Regressions Outputs for winsorized sample, for the sub-period samples 
In this table are presented the coefficients, z-statistics, number of observations, number of firms, R2 and F for the regressions with LEV as dependent 
variable (1) and LTLev as dependent variable (2), respectively, considering the sub-periods from 2005-2007, from 2008-2010 and from 2011-2014, 
for the winsorized sample. The independent variables of both regressions are: PROF, measured by the indicator ROA; LIQ, estimated by the current 
ratio; TANG, resultant of the tangibility ratio; SIZE, obtained by the natural logarithm of total assets; GROW, measured by the Tobin's Q; and 
NDTS, yielded by the ratio of depreciation and amortization to total assets. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per cent of the coefficients are 
represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
Period 2005 - 2007 2008 - 2010 2011 - 2014 
Dependent Variable LEV (1) LTLev (2) LEV (1) LTLev (2) LEV (1) LTLev (2) 
  Coefficients z Coefficients z Coefficients z Coefficients z Coefficients z Coefficients z 
PROF (0.39)*** (2.91) 0.15 0.46 (0.43)* (1.79) (0.42) (0.89) (0.36) (1.05) 0.23 0.63 
LIQ (0.05)** (2.34) 0.19*** 3.16 (0.04)** (2.17) 0.22*** 3.92 0.00 (0.02) 0.25*** 8.06 
TANG (0.27)** (2.19) (0.31) (1.38) 0.03 0.58 (0.12) (0.85) 0.00 0.00 (0.34)*** (3.92) 
SIZE 0.10*** 2.74 0.15*** 2.95 0.05 1.09 0.22*** 6.50 0.05 1.13 0.14*** 3.81 
GROW (0.23)*** (4.58) (0.01) (0.12) 0.01 0.36 (0.03) (0.47) (0.19)*** (3.03) (0.09) (1.57) 
NDTS (0.28) (0.48) (0.04) (0.04) 0.80 1.03 0.99 1.22 1.81** 2.54 0.28 0.34 
Constant 0.24 1.11 (0.14) (0.39) 0.16 0.65 (0.82)*** (3.97) 0.14 0.54 (0.20) (0.94) 
# Obs. 124 124 123 123 162 162 
# Firms 47 47 44 44 43 43 
R2 25.33% 34.91% 9.29% 39.29% 20.85% 43.09% 
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Table 10: Summary Regressions Outputs for the entire sample (2005-2015) using 
Fixed Effects model. 
In this table are presented, for the entire time period, the coefficients, t-statistics, number 
of observations, number of firms, R2 and F for the regressions with LEV as dependent 
variable (1) and LTLev as dependent variable (2), respectively. The independent variables 
of both regressions are: PROF, measured by the indicator ROA; LIQ, estimated by the 
current ratio; TANG, resultant of the tangibility ratio; SIZE, obtained by the natural 
logarithm of total assets; GROW, measured by the Tobin's Q; and NDTS, yielded by the 
ratio of depreciation and amortization to total assets. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per 
cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
Period 2005 - 2015 
Dependent Variable LEV (1) LTLev (2) 
  Coefficients t Coefficients t 
PROF (0.30)***  (6.62) 0.14**  2.43  
LIQ (0.04)*** (2.99)  0.09*** 6.20 
TANG 0.10  1.44  (0.22)*** (2.57)  
SIZE 0.13** 2.56  0.10  1.58  
GROW (0.07)*** (3.28) (0.05)*  (1.79) 
NDTS 3.75*** 7.96 (0.50) (0.84)  
Constant (0.47) (1.49)  0.14  0.36  
# Obs. 450 450 
# Firms 57 57 
R2 8.01% 31.58% 






Table 11: Summary Regressions Outputs for the sub-period samples, using Fixed Effects model. 
In this table are presented the coefficients, t-statistics, number of observations, number of firms, R2 and F for the regressions with LEV as dependent 
variable (1) and LTLev as dependent variable (2), respectively, considering the sub-periods from 2005-2007, from 2008-2010 and from 2011-2014. 
The independent variables of both regressions are: PROF, measured by the indicator ROA; LIQ, estimated by the current ratio; TANG, resultant 
of the tangibility ratio; SIZE, obtained by the natural logarithm of total assets; GROW, measured by the Tobin's Q; and NDTS, yielded by the ratio 
of depreciation and amortization to total assets. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. 
Period 2005 - 2007 2008 - 2010 2011 - 2014 
Dependent Variable LEV LTLev LEV LTLev LEV LTLev 
  Coefficients t Coefficients t Coefficients t Coefficients t Coefficients t Coefficients t 
PROF (0.11) (0.82)  (0.10) (0.44)  (0.54)*** (3.24)  0.07 0.24  (0.34)*** (5.46) 0.20*** 2.61  
LIQ (0.00) (0.14) 0.16*** 3.14  (0.02) (1.05)  0.20***  5.16  (0.05)** (2.39) 0.13*** 5.36  
TANG (0.14) (0.69)  (0.53) (1.51) 0.11  1.18  0.21  1.22  0.68*** 2.94 (0.62)** (2.16)  
SIZE 0.40*** 3.40  (0.03)  (0.17)  0.39* 1.97  0.15  0.40  0.22* 1.96 (0.00) (0.03)  
GROW (0.13)* (1.86) 0.01 0.05  0.06 1.48  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.12)* (1.76) (0.33)***  (3.76)  
NDTS 0.77  1.00 (2.47)*  (1.90)  4.10*** 4.41  3.75** 2.18 1.85* 1.97 0.66 0.56  
Constant (1.69)** (2.23)  1.20  0.94  (2.10)* (1.75)  (0.79) (0.36)  (1.33)* (1.85) 1.02  1.13  
# Obs. 124 124 123 123 162 162 
# Firms 47 47 44 44 43 43 
R2 0.76% 2.57% 0.23% 17.46% 1.17% 5.34% 
F 3.37*** 2.99** 8.73*** 4.7*** 11.06*** 7.36*** 
 
 
